Who Brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative? The Istanbul Talks Step by Step
Who brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative? A step-by-step account of the 2022 Istanbul talks, the UN–Türkiye roles, the JCC and 33+ million tons shipped.
Why It Matters
The Black Sea Grain Initiative was brokered by Türkiye and the United Nations, with Russia and Ukraine as the two parties whose consent made it work. It was signed in Istanbul on 2022-07-22, and its Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) operated from Istanbul until Russia ended its participation in July 2023. Understanding who did what, and in what order, explains both why the deal was possible and why it proved fragile.
Background
Why a corridor was needed
After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, commercial shipping out of Ukraine's Black Sea ports largely stopped. Ukraine was among the world's major exporters of wheat, maize and sunflower oil, and the UN warned of knock-on effects for food prices and for import-dependent countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Sea mines, the risk of attack on vessels and the lack of insurance blocked exports. Russia, for its part, pointed to sanctions-related frictions affecting its own grain and fertilizer shipments.
The Istanbul talks step by step
The chronology below draws on public statements by the UN, the Turkish Presidency, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of National Defence.
- March 2022: channels open. On 2022-03-10 the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers met in Antalya, hosted by Türkiye's foreign minister. On 2022-03-29 delegations from Moscow and Kyiv held talks in Istanbul. Neither produced a ceasefire, but both established Istanbul as an accepted venue.
- April–May 2022: the UN proposes a package. UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited Moscow and Kyiv in late April and then pursued a package approach, with the UN assigned to obtain safe Ukrainian exports and to ease access for Russian food and fertilizer. UN officials Martin Griffiths and Rebeca Grynspan led much of the technical work.
- June 2022: Türkiye offers the maritime framework. Russia's foreign minister Sergey Lavrov visited Ankara on 2022-06-08. Türkiye proposed using its naval and maritime capacity for demining coordination, safe passage and monitoring, with the UN as guarantor of the overall package.
- 2022-07-13: military technical meeting in Istanbul. Delegations from Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN agreed on the main elements of a joint coordination and inspection mechanism.
- 2022-07-22: signing at Dolmabahçe Palace. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Secretary-General Guterres attended the ceremony. Russia and Ukraine each concluded mirrored arrangements with Türkiye and the UN, rather than signing directly with each other. A separate memorandum between Russia and the UN Secretariat dealt with Russian food and fertilizer exports.
- 2022-07-27: JCC opens. The Joint Coordination Centre began work in Istanbul.
- 2022-08-01: first ship sails. The vessel Razoni left Odesa, followed by ships from Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi.
How the mechanics worked
- Ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi were the three designated Ukrainian ports.
- The JCC: Senior officials from Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN sat together in Istanbul, approved vessel applications, set transit schedules and coordinated inspections.
- Inspections: Joint inspection teams checked ships in Turkish waters near Istanbul, including outbound cargo and inbound vessels, to confirm that inbound ships carried no weapons and that outbound cargo matched declarations.
- Safe passage: Ships followed a designated maritime humanitarian corridor, with Ukraine guiding vessels through its waters. The parties committed to refrain from attacks on ships and port facilities covered by the arrangement.
- Duration: The initial term was 120 days, with renewal unless a party objected.
Renewals and the end
Russia briefly suspended participation on 2022-10-29, citing an alleged attack on its Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol. It resumed on 2022-11-02 after contacts that involved Türkiye and the UN. The arrangement was extended in November 2022, in March 2023 (when the parties publicly gave different durations) and in May 2023. On 2023-07-17 Russia announced that it was ending its participation. Turkish official sources and the UN put cumulative exports at roughly 33 million tons, with the UN's JCC tally around 32.9 million metric tons.
For parallel accounts of the mediation, see Interstate Journal on how Türkiye helped broker the deal and Doctrine Review on how the initiative worked and why it ended.
Key Players & Positions
Russia
Russian officials, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kremlin, said the second half of the package was not delivered. According to Moscow, the memorandum with the UN was supposed to remove barriers to Russian agricultural exports. Russia's list of grievances included the reconnection of the state agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank to the SWIFT messaging system, supplies of spare parts for agricultural machinery, easier insurance and port access, the restarting of the Togliatti–Odesa ammonia pipeline and the release of assets of fertilizer companies. Russia also argued that most cargoes went to wealthier states rather than the poorest. The UN disputed this characterization, citing JCC data, and said it continued efforts on the Russian track. Russia stated that it would return if its conditions were met.
Ukraine
The Ukrainian presidency and the Ministry of Infrastructure credited the corridor with restoring Ukrainian exports and revenue but accused Russia of obstructing it. Their complaints included slowed inspections and a growing queue of vessels in 2023, the October 2022 suspension, and the subsequent strikes on Odesa-region port infrastructure after July 2023. Ukraine rejected Russian claims that the corridor was used for military purposes. After Russia's withdrawal, Kyiv said it was ready to continue shipping and sought guarantees from Türkiye and the UN.
United Nations
The UN Secretariat was guarantor and convener. Guterres and UN officials described the initiative as a humanitarian measure for global food markets, and stressed that the Russian memorandum was an integral part of the package. After the Russian exit, the UN said it would keep seeking ways to facilitate Ukrainian and Russian exports.
Others
The EU, the United States and the G7 backed the corridor and pressed Russia to renew it. They have also argued that sanctions do not target Russian food and fertilizer exports, and that Russia's complaints concerned private-sector caution rather than legal prohibitions. Importing states in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia expressed concern about price effects when the arrangement lapsed.
Türkiye's Position
Türkiye presents itself as a facilitator that kept lines open to both belligerents. These are the points Ankara has emphasized in official statements.
- Mediation as a balanced compass. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye maintains dialogue with both Moscow and Kyiv in order to create openings for peace, and it does not accept that talking to one side requires abandoning the other. The Presidency has described the Istanbul agreement as proof that dialogue can produce results even in wartime. Türkiye has also stated support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, including Crimea, while not joining the sanctions regimes imposed on Russia.
- Hosting and guaranteeing the mechanism. Türkiye says it provided the venue, the JCC, the inspection logistics in Turkish waters and military-to-military coordination, working alongside the UN. Turkish Ministry of National Defence briefings and Presidency statements put total exports at more than 33 million tons.
- Legal basis: the 1936 Montreux Convention. Ankara argues that its credibility as an intermediary rests on strict and even-handed implementation of the Convention, including freedom of commercial passage and restrictions on warships of belligerents (Article 19). See Montreux Article 19 Explained.
- Continuity. Following Russia's July 2023 decision, the Presidency and the MFA stated Türkiye's wish to revive the arrangement and said that contacts with both sides would continue. President Erdoğan said that he expected to discuss it again with President Putin.
- Wider world interest. Ankara frames the initiative within the principle that the world is bigger than five, meaning that food security for developing states should not be held hostage to great-power rivalry.
These points reflect Ankara's own account of its role. For more on the framing, see Crossroads Review's overview of Türkiye's mediation.
Source Comparison
| Question | Turkish official sources | UN sources | Russian official sources | Ukrainian official sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Who brokered it? | Türkiye and the UN jointly; Istanbul was the hub | The UN proposed the package; Türkiye hosted and co-facilitated | Credits Türkiye's and the UN's role; stresses the Russia–UN memorandum | Credits Türkiye and the UN; stresses Ukrainian port operations |
| What did it deliver? | More than 33 million tons | About 32.9 million metric tons | Questions who benefited most | Says it restored exports and global supply |
| Why did it falter? | Differences over linked demands; Ankara urged revival | Russian track not fully implemented, in Russia's view; UN kept talks open | Its part of the package unfulfilled | Russia slowed inspections and escalated attacks |
| What next? | Contacts with both sides continue | UN seeks to facilitate exports | Return if demands met | Wants continued shipping under guarantees |
Readers can apply the method in How to Calibrate Any Claim About Türkiye Against Primary Sources to cross-check each column against the original UN documents, the signed texts and ministry briefings. Comparative context is also available at The Political Anatomy.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI): the July 2022 arrangement that allowed commercial grain and food shipments from three Ukrainian ports under joint inspection.
- Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul body of Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and UN officials that managed applications, schedules and inspections.
- Memorandum of Understanding (Russia–UN): the companion text covering Russian food and fertilizer access to world markets.
- Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits; see the Article 19 explainer.
Related reading: Unbiased Compass home, About Unbiased Compass, Editorial Principles, Reader FAQ, and the sister analysis at The Global Anatomy on Montreux and mediation.
Unbiased Compass presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered here, openly labelled as such, so that readers can weigh it alongside other views. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, legislation and Ottoman and Turkish state archives. Published by the Unbiased Compass Editorial Team.
Frequently asked questions
Who brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative?
Türkiye and the United Nations brokered it jointly. The UN, led by Secretary-General António Guterres, developed the overall package, while Türkiye hosted the talks, provided the Istanbul venue and supplied maritime and military coordination. Russia and Ukraine were the two parties whose agreement made it work.
Did Russia and Ukraine sign the same document?
No. Russia and Ukraine each concluded mirrored arrangements with Türkiye and the UN rather than signing directly with each other. A separate Russia–UN memorandum covered Russian food and fertilizer exports. The signing took place in Istanbul on 2022-07-22.
How did the Joint Coordination Centre work?
The JCC in Istanbul brought together senior Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and UN officials. It approved vessel applications, set transit schedules and organized inspections of ships in Turkish waters. Vessels then followed a designated corridor to and from the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi.
How much grain was shipped?
Turkish official sources say more than 33 million tons of grain and other foodstuffs were exported. The UN's JCC figure is about 32.9 million metric tons. The two figures are close, and the difference reflects rounding and different reporting.
Why did the initiative end?
Russia ended its participation on 2023-07-17, saying that the part of the package concerning its own agricultural and fertilizer exports had not been implemented. Ukraine and Western governments said Russia obstructed the corridor, and the UN said it kept working on both tracks. Türkiye has said it wants the arrangement revived.
Does Türkiye's role depend on the Montreux Convention?
The Montreux Convention is the legal foundation of Ankara's credibility rather than of the initiative itself. Türkiye argues that even-handed implementation, including restrictions on belligerent warships under Article 19, allowed it to act as an intermediary trusted by both sides.
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