COP31 and Zero Waste: What Does Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy Aim to Deliver?
COP31 Türkiye Zero Waste climate diplomacy explained: the UN-recognised initiative, the Antalya hosting arrangement and the climate finance debate.
Why It Matters
Türkiye's climate diplomacy now rests on two pillars: the Zero Waste initiative, which the United Nations has endorsed through a General Assembly resolution, and hosting the COP31 climate conference in Antalya in 2026. The practical question for readers is what Ankara can realistically deliver as host, since COP outcomes are decided by consensus among nearly 200 parties. This guide separates verified facts from Türkiye's stated positions and from the wider debate on climate finance and burden-sharing.
Background
The Zero Waste initiative and its UN recognition
Zero Waste is a national programme launched in 2017 under the patronage of Emine Erdoğan, the First Lady of Türkiye. It aims to reduce waste at source, improve collection and separation, and build recycling and resource-recovery systems. A national Zero Waste Regulation followed in 2019.
The initiative then moved to the multilateral level:
- 2020: The UN Secretary-General established a High-Level Advisory Board on Zero Waste, chaired by Emine Erdoğan.
- 14 December 2022: The UN General Assembly adopted resolution 77/161, proposed by Türkiye with broad co-sponsorship, which declared 30 March the International Day of Zero Waste.
- 30 March 2023: The day was observed for the first time, with UNEP and UN-Habitat facilitating it.
The resolution is a non-binding observance that endorses a policy approach. It does not create treaty obligations, and it does not mean the UN has adopted Türkiye's national programme as a standard.
Türkiye's place in the climate regime
Türkiye acceded to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2004 and to the Kyoto Protocol in 2009. It is listed in Annex I of the Convention (the list of industrialised and transition economies) but not in Annex II, the narrower list of countries expected to provide finance. The 2001 Marrakesh Accords (decision 26/CP.7) recognised Türkiye's 'special circumstances' within the Convention.
Türkiye's parliament (TBMM) approved the Paris Agreement in October 2021, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced a net-zero target for 2053 at the UN General Assembly that September. Türkiye submitted an updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) in 2023, framed as a reduction against a business-as-usual baseline for 2030. In July 2025 the Turkish parliament passed a Climate Law establishing a domestic legal framework that includes an emissions trading system. Readers should consult the latest UNFCCC NDC registry for the current numeric targets, which are expressed against a projected baseline rather than a historical year, a point critics often raise.
The COP31 hosting decision
Under UNFCCC practice, COP presidencies rotate among five regional groups. The 2026 turn belonged to the Western European and Others Group, in which both Türkiye and Australia sought to host. At COP30 in Belém (November 2025), a compromise was announced: COP31 will be held in Antalya, Türkiye, in November 2026, with Türkiye's Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Murat Kurum, as the COP President and Australia's climate minister, Chris Bowen, in a role described as President of Negotiations. A pre-COP meeting in the Pacific was also announced. How responsibilities are split in practice is being worked out through UNFCCC procedures, and readers should check official UNFCCC and host-country announcements for details that have not been formally published.
For related coverage from our network, see Borders & Blocs: COP31, Zero Waste and Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy and Interstate Journal: COP31 in Antalya.
Key Players & Positions
Climate negotiations are shaped by blocs more than by single states. The positions below are summarised from their own public statements and negotiating records.
| Actor | Broad position | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Australia | Co-leading COP31 negotiations; emphasises Pacific priorities and a successful negotiated outcome | Statements by the Australian government around COP30 |
| Pacific small island states | Prioritise adaptation, loss and damage, and the 1.5°C goal | Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) submissions |
| European Union | Stresses faster mitigation, phase-down of fossil fuels and a wider donor base for finance, including major emitters | EU Council conclusions and negotiating mandates |
| Developing-country groups (G77/China, African Group, LMDC) | Insist that developed countries lead on finance under 'common but differentiated responsibilities' and oppose unilateral trade measures | G77 and group statements at the UNFCCC |
| United States | The government announced withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in January 2025; it has stepped back from multilateral climate finance | White House and State Department announcements |
| Türkiye | Supports a just, fair approach to burden-sharing and recognises its own 'special circumstances'; promotes Zero Waste as a practical contribution | Presidency and Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change statements |
The finance and burden-sharing debate
The main fault line is climate finance. In 2009 developed countries pledged USD 100 billion a year by 2020; the OECD reported that the goal was first met in 2022. At COP29 in Baku (November 2024), parties agreed a New Collective Quantified Goal of at least USD 300 billion a year by 2035 from developed countries, within a broader aspiration of USD 1.3 trillion a year from all sources. Many developing countries called this insufficient, while donor governments argued that public budgets are limited and that private capital and large emerging economies must contribute.
Another question is who counts as a contributor. The Convention's annexes date from 1992, and some donors argue that they no longer reflect economic reality. Others reply that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (UNFCCC Article 3) was not meant to be rewritten without consensus. Türkiye sits in the middle of this debate because it is an Annex I country with a fast-growing economy and rising emissions, but it is not on the Annex II donor list.
Türkiye's Position
The points below reflect Türkiye's official policy as stated by Turkish government sources. They are positions, not independent findings.
- Zero Waste as a climate solution. According to the Presidency and the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, waste reduction and resource efficiency are part of mitigation, and Zero Waste is offered as a replicable, low-cost model. Ankara points to UN General Assembly resolution 77/161 and the Secretary-General's Advisory Board as international recognition.
- Fair burden-sharing. Ankara argues that Türkiye's historical emissions are low compared with those of long-industrialised economies and that it should receive support in line with the Convention's principles. It cites the 2001 Marrakesh decision 26/CP.7 on its special circumstances and the Paris Agreement's provisions on finance (Articles 2.1(c) and 9).
- A long-term pathway. The Presidency has presented the 2053 net-zero target, the 2021 Paris ratification and the 2025 Climate Law as evidence that Türkiye is aligning its economy with climate goals while keeping energy security and development in view.
- Presidency as facilitator. Turkish officials describe the COP31 presidency as an opportunity to build consensus, working with Australia and Pacific partners under the compromise reached at COP30, and to bring practical, implementation-focused initiatives such as Zero Waste to the negotiating agenda. The agenda of the conference will ultimately be set through UNFCCC processes rather than by the host alone.
This stance mirrors Türkiye's broader approach to multilateral diplomacy, including its calls for institutional reform summarised in Regional Balance: Türkiye's Global Diplomacy.
Source Comparison
Coverage of Türkiye's climate role varies depending on the source and the angle chosen. The table summarises common framings and how to check them.
| Question | Common international framing | Turkish official framing | How to verify |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Türkiye a credible COP host? | Some analysts point to continued reliance on coal and to a 2030 target set against a projected baseline | Officials point to the 2053 net-zero goal, Paris ratification and the 2025 Climate Law | UNFCCC NDC registry, national inventory submissions, text of the Climate Law |
| What is Zero Waste? | Seen as a worthwhile waste-management programme whose climate impact is hard to quantify | Presented as a core climate and resource-efficiency model with UN endorsement | UN resolution 77/161; UNEP and UN-Habitat material |
| Developed or developing? | Türkiye is often grouped with major emerging economies or with OECD members | Ankara stresses its Annex I but non-Annex II status and its special circumstances | UNFCCC annex lists; decision 26/CP.7 |
| Who leads COP31? | Reports emphasise the shared arrangement with Australia | Turkish sources emphasise the COP President role of the host country | UNFCCC and host-government announcements |
The general lesson is to read primary documents, such as decision texts, the UN resolution and the NDC submission, rather than relying on a summary. Our five-step method for calibrating claims about Türkiye and our Editorial Principles set out how we separate fact, position and source.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- COP (Conference of the Parties): the annual meeting of states party to the UNFCCC. Decisions require consensus.
- COP President / President of Negotiations: the host presides over the conference; COP31 has an announced arrangement under which negotiating leadership is shared with Australia.
- NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution): each party's self-set climate plan under the Paris Agreement.
- Annex I / Annex II: UNFCCC lists of industrialised countries (I) and those expected to provide finance (II). Türkiye is in Annex I only.
- CBDR-RC: common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, the principle behind climate burden-sharing.
- NCQG: the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance agreed in Baku in 2024.
- Zero Waste: a policy approach, promoted by Türkiye and recognised by the UN General Assembly, that prioritises prevention, reuse and recycling.
Related guides on Türkiye's multilateral diplomacy:
- Montreux Article 19 Explained: How Did Türkiye Close the Straits to Belligerent Warships in 2022?
- Who Brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative? The Istanbul Talks Step by Step
- About Unbiased Compass: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team
- Reader FAQ: Sources, Method and Perspective at Unbiased Compass
- Unbiased Compass: Primary-Source Analysis and Türkiye's Official Perspective
Perspective Note
Unbiased Compass presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered here, openly labelled as such, so that readers can weigh it alongside other views. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, legislation and Ottoman and Turkish state archives. This article was prepared by the Unbiased Compass Editorial Team.
Frequently asked questions
Where and when will COP31 take place?
COP31 is scheduled for November 2026 in Antalya, Türkiye, following the compromise accepted at COP30 in Belém. Australia holds a negotiations-focused role under the same arrangement. Check the UNFCCC website for exact dates and logistics.
What is Türkiye's Zero Waste initiative?
Zero Waste is a national programme launched in 2017 under the patronage of Emine Erdoğan that promotes waste prevention, separate collection, reuse and recycling. It led to a 2019 national regulation and to a UN High-Level Advisory Board established in 2020. It is a policy approach, not a treaty regime.
Has the UN officially recognised Zero Waste?
Yes, in a specific sense: on 14 December 2022 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 77/161, proclaiming 30 March the International Day of Zero Waste. This is a non-binding observance facilitated by UNEP and UN-Habitat. It is endorsement of the concept, not certification of any national programme.
Is Türkiye treated as a developed or a developing country in climate talks?
Türkiye is listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC but not in Annex II, which lists countries expected to provide finance. The 2001 Marrakesh Accords recognised its special circumstances. Ankara cites this when arguing for fair burden-sharing, while some donors argue that the 1992 annexes need updating.
What is the main disagreement over climate finance?
The dispute is over how much money developed countries should provide and who else should contribute. COP29 set a goal of at least USD 300 billion a year by 2035, which many developing countries called too low. Donors counter that public budgets are constrained and that wealthier emerging economies should also contribute.
Does the COP host decide the conference outcome?
No. The host presides and shapes the process, but decisions are taken by consensus among all parties. This is why the practical impact of a presidency depends on trust, diplomacy and the preparatory consultations rather than on host-country policy alone.
Related guides
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