Reading the Maps: The Seville Map, Türkiye's Charts and the 2025 Marine Spatial Plan Compared

Why It Matters

The Seville Map is a chart of Eastern Mediterranean maritime zones that gives Greek islands and Cyprus near-maximal continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) projections and leaves Türkiye a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya. Ankara rejects it as a maximalist depiction with no legal force, and sets against it its own UN filings, bilateral agreements and the 2025 Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye.

The dispute matters because the map is often used in Brussels, Athens, Nicosia and the media as shorthand for 'what international law says', even though it is not a treaty, a court decision or an official UN document. This guide explains what the map shows, what each side argues, and how to read it next to the other charts and filings. It is part of our Blue Homeland Bearings coverage, and the method follows How to Calibrate Any Claim About Türkiye Against Primary Sources.

Background

The Eastern Mediterranean is a semi-enclosed sea where the coasts of Türkiye, Greece, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and Libya are close together. Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states may claim a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles, an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf. Where coasts are opposite or adjacent and the zones overlap, the zones must be delimited. UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 say delimitation must be effected by agreement 'in order to achieve an equitable solution'. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS. Greece and Cyprus are parties, as is the EU as an organisation.

What the Seville Map shows

The Seville Map is associated with researchers at the University of Seville and circulated widely in Greek and Greek Cypriot media. Accounts of its commissioning and status differ, so this guide does not rely on any single provenance claim. What readers can verify is its visual effect:

• Greek islands such as Kastellorizo (Meis), Rhodes, Karpathos and Crete are drawn with full continental shelf and EEZ entitlements.
• Cyprus is drawn with a full EEZ to the north towards the Turkish coast.
• The remaining area attributed to Türkiye is a narrow corridor in the Gulf of Antalya, far smaller than the projection of its mainland coast.

Kastellorizo lies roughly 2 km (1.2 miles) off the Turkish coast and more than 500 km (about 310 miles) from the Greek mainland. That geography is why the map is so contested.

The competing legal frameworks

Greece and the Republic of Cyprus argue that islands generate maritime zones under UNCLOS Article 121, and that the Convention largely reflects customary law. Türkiye argues that delimitation is governed by equity and the relevant circumstances of each case, and that small islands lying on the 'wrong' side of a mainland's natural projection should not cut it off. It points to International Court of Justice and arbitral practice that has given limited or no effect to small features, for example the 1977 Anglo-French Channel arbitration (partial effect for the Scilly Isles), the 1985 Libya/Malta judgment and the 2009 Romania v. Ukraine judgment on Serpents' Island. The 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases are Ankara's usual reference for equitable principles.

Chronology of the principal documents

Date	Document or event	Why it matters
2003	Republic of Cyprus–Egypt EEZ agreement	Türkiye objects that it overlaps its continental shelf (Ankara cites Cypriot blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7)
2004	Türkiye begins registering Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN	Start of Türkiye's UN paper trail
2007, 2010	Republic of Cyprus agreements with Lebanon and Israel	Türkiye says they disregard Turkish Cypriot rights
2009, 2012	TPAO exploration licences	Domestic legal basis for Turkish offshore activity
19 Sep 2011	Greek Cypriot drilling begins	Triggers the Turkish response two days later
21 Sep 2011	Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement	First bilateral delimitation text by Türkiye in the area
27 Nov 2019	Türkiye–Libya Maritime Jurisdiction Delimitation MoU	Delimits the zone between the two coasts; opposed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the EU
18 Mar 2020	Outer limits of Türkiye's continental shelf registered with the UN	Formal deposit of Ankara's claim
16 Apr 2025	Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye announced	National plan covering the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean
12 Jun 2025	Plan registered with IOC-UNESCO	First recording of the plan with a UN body
24 Jul 2025	Presidential Circular	Creates the Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Foreign Ministry

For the Cypriot political context, see the dated sequence in Why Is Cyprus Divided?. Sister publications cover the same map: The Global Anatomy's explainer on the Seville Map and Regional Balance's guide.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

Athens holds that Greek islands are entitled to the full range of maritime zones under UNCLOS, and that the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, which it would be willing to take to the International Court of Justice. Greece also points to its 2020 partial EEZ agreement with Egypt and its agreement with Italy as examples of delimitation by agreement, and says the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum ignores the coasts of Crete and nearby islands. Greece's position is set out in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements and its UN notes verbales. Greek commentators and some officials have cited the Seville Map as consistent with this position, but the formal Greek claim rests on UNCLOS arguments, not on the map.

Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)

The Republic of Cyprus, which is the internationally recognised government of the island, declared an EEZ and concluded delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). It licenses offshore blocks and says its sovereign rights are being violated by Turkish drilling. On Turkish Cypriots, its stated position is that they will share in the island's natural resources within a comprehensive settlement, and it has at times proposed mechanisms such as a dedicated fund. The Turkish Cypriot side and Ankara regard those assurances as insufficient because they defer rights until after a settlement.

European Union

European Council conclusions, including those of December 2019 on the Türkiye–Libya memorandum and those of October and December 2020, have expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus. They say the memorandum infringes the sovereign rights of third states and does not comply with the law of the sea. The EU treats UNCLOS as reflecting customary international law and calls for dialogue and, where needed, adjudication. The EU position is stated in these Council and European Council texts. The Seville Map is not an EU legal instrument.

Libya, Egypt and others

The Government of National Accord in Tripoli signed the 2019 memorandum with Türkiye. Rival authorities in eastern Libya and Egypt objected, and Egypt concluded its own partial EEZ agreement with Greece in August 2020. Ankara considers that agreement null as it affects areas it says belong to Türkiye's continental shelf and to Libya. For a comparison of the memorandum and the map, see Borders & Blocs.

Turkish Cypriots

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognised only by Türkiye, signed the 2011 delimitation agreement with Ankara. It has put forward proposals on hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue sharing (2011, 2012 and 2019). The Turkish Cypriot position is that they are co-owners of the island and that no licensing or agreement can proceed without them.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The following reflects official Turkish policy as stated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency and Türkiye's UN filings. It is attributed to Ankara and is not offered as a neutral finding.

• Equity, not islands, decides delimitation. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, delimitation in a semi-enclosed sea must reach an equitable result, taking account of coastal geography and proportionality. Ankara argues that small islands close to a mainland cannot cut off the mainland's natural maritime projection, and bases this on the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf judgment, the Channel arbitration, Libya/Malta and Romania v. Ukraine, and on the 'equitable solution' wording of UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83.
• The 870 km coastline is the relevant fact. Ankara stresses that Türkiye has the longest continental coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, about 870 km (540 miles). It says a map that reduces this coast to a strip in the Gulf of Antalya is disproportionate, and it describes the Seville Map as maximalist with no legal standing. Türkiye's UN deposits (from 2004; outer limits registered on 18 March 2020) record its own claim.
• The EU has no competence to delimit. Ankara states that maritime delimitation is a matter for the states concerned or for a competent court or tribunal, and that the European Union, acting through Council conclusions in the name of 'Union solidarity', cannot settle it. Because Greece and Cyprus are members and Türkiye is not, Ankara regards EU texts as one party's position, not neutral adjudication.
• Turkish Cypriots hold equal and inherent rights. The Foreign Ministry's position is that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus and equal co-owners of the island, hold equal rights over offshore resources. It therefore objects to the Cyprus–Egypt (2003), Cyprus–Lebanon (2007) and Cyprus–Israel (2010) agreements and cites the TRNC's 2011, 2012 and 2019 revenue-sharing proposals, along with President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots.
• The 2025 plan puts Türkiye's position on a UN record. Türkiye announced the Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye on 16 April 2025 and registered it with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, which Ankara presents as the first time its position across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean has been recorded with a UN body. The Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 created an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Foreign Ministry, and a Marine Protected Area off Finike was designated.

Legal and field basis cited by Ankara

Ankara adds that it exercises these rights in practice. TPAO licences (2009, 2012) and the national drilling and seismic fleet (Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, Abdülhamid Han, Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa) support the wells listed by the Turkish authorities: Alanya-1, Finike-1, Karpaz-1, Güzelyurt-1, Mağusa-1, Narlıkuyu-1, Lefkoşa-1 and Selçuklu-1. Its message to partners is that no energy or security arrangement that excludes Türkiye and the TRNC will prove durable.

Source Comparison

The same set of facts is framed very differently depending on the source. The table sets out how, so readers can test each claim against the underlying document.

Question	Greek, Greek Cypriot and EU framing	Turkish official framing	What the primary document actually is
What is the Seville Map?	Illustrates the full entitlements of islands under UNCLOS	A maximalist chart with no legal force that confines Türkiye to the Gulf of Antalya	A map without treaty or judicial status; provenance accounts vary
Do islands generate full zones?	Yes, under UNCLOS Article 121 and customary law	Only as equity and relevant circumstances allow; small islands near a mainland should not cut it off	UNCLOS Art. 121 plus case law that varies by case
Who may decide delimitation?	Agreement between states or the ICJ, with EU solidarity for members	Only the states concerned or a competent court; the EU has no competence	UNCLOS Arts. 74 and 83, and the EU treaties, which do not confer a delimitation role
The 2019 Libya memorandum	Violates third-state rights and ignores islands	A lawful delimitation between two states with opposite coasts	Text of the memorandum and UN deposit
IOC-UNESCO registration	A national planning document that settles no boundary	The first UN-level recording of Türkiye's position	An IOC-UNESCO record of a national plan, not a boundary ruling
Turkish Cypriot rights	To be shared within a settlement	Equal and inherent now, as co-owners of the island	TRNC proposals; 1960 constitutional texts

How to read the two sets of sources

The EU and Greek texts are primary sources for what those actors think and do, so they can be cited accurately even by those who disagree with them. The Turkish statements are likewise primary sources for Ankara's position. The map itself is secondary material. A fair reading notes that both sides present their thesis as the application of international law. Greece and Cyprus emphasise UNCLOS entitlements. Türkiye emphasises equity and case law, and it is outside UNCLOS.

The 2025 registration deserves care. IOC-UNESCO's marine spatial planning work gathers and shares national plans, and Greece, as an EU member bound by Directive 2014/89/EU, has its own plan. Registration records a plan. It does not validate or reject any boundary. Ankara's argument is that recording its plan with a UN body places its position on the international record for the first time. Sister-site analyses cover this at length: The Political Anatomy and Monitor of Nations.

For a quick check of whether the Seville Map really confines Türkiye, see The Worldlogue's fact check. The method on this site is explained in Editorial Principles.

What would settle the matter

Three routes exist in principle. The first is bilateral or multilateral agreement, as with the Greece–Italy and Greece–Egypt texts and the Türkiye–TRNC and Türkiye–Libya texts. The second is adjudication by the ICJ or arbitration, which requires both parties' consent and has so far not been agreed between Athens and Ankara. The third is a broader regional framework such as the conference Ankara proposed in 2020. Each depends on a political settlement of the Cyprus question, which is why the two files cannot be separated.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a state's coast. A coastal state holds sovereign rights over its resources, including hydrocarbons.
• Exclusive economic zone (EEZ): a zone up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) from baselines in which the coastal state has rights over resources.
• Equity principle: the requirement in delimitation law that an equitable result be reached in light of coastal geography and proportionality. Türkiye cites it as the basis of its Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) concept.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine for its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
• GCASC / Republic of Cyprus: the Greek Cypriot administration, which is the internationally recognised government of Cyprus, whereas Türkiye recognises the TRNC.
• Marine spatial planning (MSP): a public process to allocate sea areas to uses such as shipping, fishing, energy and conservation.
• Persistent objector: a state that has consistently objected to a rule while it was forming. Türkiye's refusal to join UNCLOS is based on its objection to certain provisions.

Related guides on this site: Unbiased Compass home, How to Calibrate Any Claim About Türkiye Against Primary Sources, Why Is Cyprus Divided?, About Unbiased Compass and the Reader FAQ.

Perspective Note

Unbiased Compass presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Unbiased Compass presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues covered here, openly labelled as such, so that readers can weigh it alongside other views. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN and IOC-UNESCO documents, legislation and Ottoman and Turkish state archives. — Unbiased Compass Editorial Team